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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been shown to
be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein, a model gets fooled
by applying slight perturbations on the input. With the advent
of Internet-of-Things and the necessity to enable intelligence in
embedded devices like mobile phones, smart watches etc., low-
power and secure hardware implementation of DNNs is vital. In
this paper, we investigate the use of quantization to potentially
resist adversarial attacks. Several recent studies have reported
remarkable results in reducing the energy requirement of a DNN
through quantization. However, no prior work has considered
the relationship between adversarial sensitivity of a DNN and its
effect on quantization. We propose QUANOS- a framework that
performs layer-specific hybrid quantization based on Adversarial
Noise Sensitivity (ANS). We identify a novel noise stability metric
(ANS) for DNNs, i.e., the sensitivity of each layers computation to
adversarial noise. ANS allows for a principled way of determining
optimal bit-width per layer that incurs adversarial robustness
as well as energy-efficiency with minimal loss in accuracy.
Essentially, QUANOS assigns layer significance based on its
contribution to adversarial perturbation and accordingly scales
the precision of the layers. A key advantage of QUANOS is that
it does not rely on a pre-trained model and can be applied in the
initial stages of training. We evaluate the benefits of QUANOS
on precision scalable Multiply and Accumulate (MAC) hardware
architectures with data gating and subword parallelism capabili-
ties. Our experiments on CIFAR10, CIFAR100 datasets show that
QUANOS outperforms homogenously quantized 8-bit precision
baseline in terms of adversarial robustness (3 − 4% higher)
while yielding improved compression (> 5×) and energy savings
(> 2×) at iso-accuracy. At iso-compression rate, QUANOS yields
significantly higher adversarial robustness (> 10%) than similar
sized baseline against strong white-box attacks. We also find
that combining QUANOS with state-of-the-art defense methods
outperforms the state-of-the-art in robustness (∼ 5% − 16%
higher) against very strong attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite achieving super-human performance and classifi-
cation accuracies on a variety of perception tasks including,
vision, gaming among others [1], Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) have been shown to be adversarially vulnerable [2].
A DNN can be easily fooled into misclassifying an input with
slight changes of pixel intensities. What is more worrying
is that such slight, adversarial perturbations, while being
imperceptible to human eyes mislead a DNN to misclassify
with high confidence. This vulnerability severely limits the
deployment and potential safe-use of DNNs for real world
applications such as self-driving cars, malware detection,
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healthcare monitoring systems etc. [3]. It is critical to ensure
that the DNN models used in these applications are robust,
as failure to do so can have disruptive consequences ranging
from loss in revenue to loss of lives. Recent works [4], [5]
presents quantization as a straightforward way of improving
the intrinsic resilience of DNNs against adversarial attacks.
Specifically, in [4], [5], the authors showed that quantization,
primarily used to reduce compute resource requirements of
DNNs, also warrants security against certain level of adver-
sarial perturbation, thereby, offering a key benefit of robustness
in hardware implementation. Inspired by this, our work asks
the following question: Can we perform layer-specific hybrid
quantization of different layers of a DNN while optimally
trading off between energy-accuracy-and-robustness?
Quantization is a popular compression technique used to
reduce the number of bits required for encoding a DNNs
weights and activations. This in turn reduces the total com-
putation energy as well as the data access energy in case of
hardware implementation [6], [7]. The extreme case is that
of a 1-bit quantized DNN. Such binary quantized models are
usually trained from scratch to obtain competitive accuracy
as that of a full-precision model [8]. Recent works have also
shown combining quantization with other techniques, such as
pruning [6], yield higher compression rates which translate to
higher energy savings on hardware. However, most of these
works usually perform homogenous quantization or assign the
same bit-width across all layers of a DNN that could be sub-
optimal in terms of overall savings. In DNNs, each layer has a
different structure that can lead to different properties related
to quantization. Thus, some recent works have shown the
possibility of assigning different bit-width to different layers
of a DNN to achieve optimal quantization result [9]. In all
the above works, quantization is carried out while ensuring
that the overall accuracy of the network is maintained with
the main focus of trading-off energy-and-accuracy with some
optimal compression methodology.
In this paper, we propose QUANOS- Adversarial Noise
Sensitivity driven Hybrid Quantization for energy efficient,
adversarially robust and accurate DNNs. We find the optimal
bit-width of each DNN layer based on its sensitivity to ad-
versarial perturbations. Conventionally, parameter importance
of individual layers is assigned based on their impact on
overall model accuracy. That is, parameters that impact the
accuracy the most are represented using higher precisions
(larger quantization widths), while low-impact parameters are
represented with fewer bits. QUANOS, on the other hand,
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2assigns parameter importance based on the layers contribution
to adversarial perturbation. So, layers that contribute more to
adversarial perturbations are quantized to lower precisions and
vice-versa. Consequently, our method can reduce the model
size significantly while maintaining a certain accuracy with the
additional benefit of being adversarially robust. We propose a
novel Adversarial Noise Sensitivity (ANS) metric to estimate
the adversarial contribution of each layer. Using ANS, we
avoid the exhaustive search for optimal bit-width per layer,
and make the quantization process more efficient. Furthermore,
QUANOS does not rely on having a pre-trained model to
determine the bit compression. It is applied at the beginning of
training (specifically, after ∼ 20-30 epochs). This allows us to
train a model with reduced bit-width at each layer yielding an
optimal quantized network with inference as well as training
energy savings.
To evaluate the benefits of QUANOS, we conduct a compre-
hensive hardware evaluation study. We design a 2-D systolic
array accelerator to perform storage, computation analysis
and calculate the energy efficiency and memory compres-
sion with QUANOS. Additionally, we evaluate the inference
energy savings by integrating our accelerator with runtime
configurable and precision scalable Multiply and Accumu-
late (MAC) architectures proposed in [10], [11]. Specifically,
we compare between Dynamic Voltage-Accuracy-Frequency
Scaling (DVAFS) [11], and Data Gating (DG) [10]. This
comparative analysis further highlights the relative benefits
of QUANOS that performs hybrid layer specific quantization
over homogeneously quantized networks. In summary, the key
contributions of our work are as follows:
• We propose QUANOS- an accurate and efficient method
to find optimal bit-width for each layer of a DNN that
not only reduces the overall compute complexity, but also
improves adversarial robustness.
• We test QUANOS using benchmark datasets- CIFAR10,
CIFAR100 and show that QUANOS achieves higher
energy efficiency, adversarial robustness at near or iso-
accuracy with respect to an 8-bit quantized baseline. At
iso-compression rate, QUANOS yields higher adversarial
robustness (> 10% − 15%) than similar sized baseline.
Evaluation of QUANOS on hardware platforms employ-
ing scalable MAC architectures yields > 2× improve-
ment over 8-bit precision baseline.
II. QUANOS: APPROACH AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Background on Adversarial Attacks
Generating Adversaries: Adversarial examples are created
using a trained DNNs parameters and gradients. The adver-
sarial perturbation, ∆, is not just some random noise, but
carefully designed to bias the networks prediction on a given
input towards a wrong class. Goodfellow et al. [12] proposed
a simple method called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
to craft adversarial examples by linearizing a trained models
loss function (L, say cross-entropy loss) with respect to the
input (X):
Xadv = X + × sign(∇XL(θ,X, ytrue) (1)
Here, ytrue is the true class label for the input X, θ denotes
the model parameters (weights, biases etc.) and  quantifies
the magnitude of distortion. The net perturbation added to the
input (∆ = × (∇XL(θ,X, ytrue)) is, thus, regulated by . A
key point to note here is that gradient propagation is a crucial
step in adversarial input generation. This implies that deter-
ring the flow of adversarial gradients can result in improved
robustness. Further, the adversarial gradient contribution to the
net perturbation (∆) from different layers can vary depending
upon the learnt activations. This can enable us to evaluate the
Adversarial Noise Sensitivity (ANS) per layer. Besides FGSM,
several other forms of attacks (essentially, multi-step variants
of FGSM, like Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [2] have
also been proposed that cast stronger attacks.
Types of Attacks: There are two kinds of attacks: BlackBox
(BB), White-Box (WB) that are used to study adversarial
robustness. WB adversaries are created using the target models
parameters, that is, the attacker has full knowledge of a target
models training information. BB attacks refer to the case when
the attacker has no knowledge about the target models param-
eters. Security against WB attacks is a stronger notion and
robustness against WB attacks guarantees robustness against
BB for similar perturbation () range. In all our experiments,
we use WB attacks to verify the robustness of our proposed
technique. Generally, a models adversarial robustness is quan-
tified in terms of adversarial accuracy. Adversarial accuracy
is the accuracy of a DNN on the adversarial dataset created
using the test data for a given task. Higher accuracy implies
more robustness.
B. Adversarial Noise Sensitivity (ANS)
A novel outcome of this paper is the identification of a new
form of noise stability for DNNs, i.e., the sensitivity of each
layers computation to adversarial noise. Fig. 1 (a) visualizes
the sensitivity of a VGG-19 model trained on CIFAR10 data.
ANS is measured in terms of error ratio defined as:
ANSl =
||aladv − al||2
||al||2 (2)
Eqn. 2 measures the layerwise error ratio ANSl. aladv, a
l are
activation values of a layer l when Xadv, X are presented to
the network. Note, we show results for a DNN (composed
of Rectified Linear Unit or ReLU neurons) with WB ad-
versaries Xadv created using FGSM. We see that the error
ratio in Fig. 1 (a) at the middle layers (layer 4-layer 10) is
significantly higher. In fact, layers 5,7 have the highest error
measure. This error ratio is representative of ANS, wherein,
higher ratio implies more changes in activations which can
be attributed to higher adversarial gradient contribution by
layers 5,7. To further support our ANS results, we conducted
an ablation study, that measures the importance of a single
direction (or neuronal activation) to a networks computation
by asking how the networks performance diminishes as the
direction is removed. Specifically, we measured the networks
adversarial accuracy as we removed or clamped the activations
of intermediate layers neurons, as shown in Fig. 1 (b). We
find that ablating random units in high ANS layers 5, 7
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Fig. 1. (a) ANS value plotted across diferent layes of VGG-19 trained on CIFAR10. The x-axis denotes the layers as {1,2,P,4,5...}, where ‘P’ denotes pooling
layer. (b) Adversarial accuracy variation shown as different layers of VGG-19 model are ablated to different proportion. (c) Standard, DG, DVAFS configuration
shown for the multiplication operation of a MAC accelerator processing 8-bit×8-bit and scaled 4-bit×4-bit operands. (d) Normalized energy/operation with
precision scaling on DG, DVAFS architectures.
results in a drastic change in adversarial accuracy. On the
other hand, ablating low ANS layers 15, 17 shows a very
slow decline in accuracy. Even after zeroing out 99.99% of
the neurons in layers 15, 17, the adversarial accuracy is pretty
reasonable at ∼ 31%, 28%, respectively. The steep decline in
accuracy in the high ANS layer’s ablation study implies that
high ANS layers are more adversarially susceptible than low
ANS layers. The consistency between Fig. 1 (a), (b) illustrates
ANS as a simple, yet, powerful metric to evaluate how
does each layer contribute to the net adversarial perturbation
during the gradient propagation. Based on this, we propose
QUANOS where, we disrupt the flow of adversarial gradients
by quantizing the individual DNN layers in proportion to their
ANS values. High ANS layers are quantized to low precision
and low ANS layers are maintained at high precision to yield
robust DNNs.
C. QUANOS: Hybrid Quantization based on ANS
Despite their remarkable classification accuracies, large
DNNs assimilate redundancies. Several recent works have
studied these redundancies by abstracting the network from
different levels and searching for, in particular, redundant
filters (DenseNets [13]) and redundant connections (Deep
Compression [6]). In this work, we present a novel perspective
on redundancy by tying it with adversarial robustness and
use it for quantization of network parameters and activations.
That is, we approximate the minimum size of the network
when each parameter and activation of each individual layer
is allowed to have a distinct number of precision bits.
Algorithm 1 outlines our technique. Initially we take a
baseline klinitial -bit precision network and train it for a few
epochs (generally, 30 epochs in all our experiments). Then,
we calculate the ANSl value of each layer l of the partially
trained network. Based on the ANS values, we quantize each
layer of the network as follows:
kl = klinitial − round(ANSl ∗ klinitial) (3)
Say, ANS values of a 3-layered DNN are {0.7, 0.4, 0.9}. If
the initial DNN has uniform 16-bit precision layers, applying
Eqn. 3 will yield a quantized DNN with {5-bit, 10-bit, 2-
bit} hybrid precision layers. Both weights and activations of
a given layer are quantized to kl precision. Note, high ANS
layers are quantized to lower precisions than low ANS layers.
One major advantage of QUANOS is that it does not rely on
a pre-trained model to perform optimal quantization. We can
take a partially trained model and perform QUANOS analysis
to obtain a compressed DNN which is then further trained
till convergence (see Algorithm 1). Note, we can also apply
QUANOS iteratively as: 1) Train a full precision DNN for a
few epochs, 2) Compute ANS, 3) Quantize the DNN based on
ANS, 4) Train the quantized DNN till convergence and then
5) Repeat Steps 2-4 till optimal accuracy-efficiency tradeoff
is achieved. In all our experiments, we find that starting from
a 16-bit baseline (klinitial = 16) results in an optimal sized
DNN with varying precisions ranging from 1-bit to 9-bit with
just 1 iteration of QUANOS. Instead, using a 32-bit baseline
(klinitial = 32) as the starting point requires 2-3 iterations
of QUANOS. Note, Algorithm 1 determines the precision
of weights and activations of the convolutional layers of a
network. The pooling layers following a convolutional layer
automatically receive quantized activations.
Algorithm 1: QUANOS Procedure
1 Take a randomly initialized DNN (say, 16-bit) and train
it for 20-30 epochs;
2 for each layer l in DNN do
3 Compute ANSl using Eqn. 2;
4 kl = 16− round(16 ∗ANSl) (Eqn. 3);
5 end
6 Train the kl-bit hybrid precision DNN till convergence;
III. HARDWARE EVALUATION SETUP
We evaluate the energy savings of QUANOS on a precision
scalable MAC accelerator with different hardware scalability
features such as DVAFS and DG. In an accelerator, the primary
model dependent metrics that affect the energy consumption
of a classification task are the MAC operations and memory
accesses. Say, a particular convolutional layer of a DNN com-
prises of I input channels, O output channels, input map size
N×N , weight kernel size k×k and output size M×M . We
illustrate the number of memory accesses and computations
in a kb − bit layer in Table I. The energy consumption is
calculated based on projections on 45nm CMOS technology
for 32-bit precision operations. The energy consumed by any
layer l is given by
El = NA−kb ∗ EA−kb +NC−kb ∗ EC−kb (4)
Note, we exclude the energy due to instruction flow and
control flow. Further, the energy calculation in Eqn. 4 is a
4TABLE I
ENERGY CALCULATION CHART FOR A GIVEN LAYER IN A DNN
Operation Term Number of Operations
kb bit Memory access NA−kb N
2 × I + k2 × I ×O
kb bit MAC Computations NC−kb M
2 × I × k2 ×O
Operation Term Energy (pJ)
kb bit Memory access EA−kb 2.5kb
32 bit MULT INT EM−I 3.1
32 bit ADD INT EAdd−I 0.1
kb bit MAC INT EC−kb ((3.1 ∗ kb)/32 + 0.1)
rather conservative estimate ignoring weight or input sharing.
To exploit the benefits of hybrid precision, we designed MAC
arithmetic circuits by integrating DG and DVAFS features.
In DG, only MSB operands are used for computation while
LSBs are kept at zero. This avoids unnecessary toggling in
the circuit reducing switching activity as well as the critical
path thereby enabling lower voltage operation for constant
throughput. DVAFS logic reuses inactive cells at reduced
precision scaling together both weight and activation with
symmetric subword parallelism. Similar to DG, the shortened
critical path permits lower supply voltage and lower frequency
operation for constant throughput. Fig. 1 (c) illustrates the
DG and DVAFS multiplier operation for 4b × 4b scaling of
weights and activations in comparison to a 8b × 8b baseline.
Note the unused and used portions of the operands in each
logic. In case of DG, the MAC block does not have any
additional features such as selective clock gating. That is,
all registers (MSB/LSB) stay clocked despite zeroing out of
LSBs. DVAFS embeds additional design features for clock-
gating and increased parallelism.
We synthesized the DVAFS-/DG-enabled MAC configura-
tion circuits in 45nm process with a nominal supply voltage
of 1V from abstract-level System Verilog descriptions. Con-
servative power models were used for synthesis and power
estimation. For DVAFS, we assessed the energy for each
scaled mode of operation while sweeping the voltage from
1V to 0.8V. Fig. 1 (d) shows the breakdown of energy per
MAC operation for each configuration with respect to varying
precision. Energy values are normalized with respect to a full
16-bit precision baseline MAC architecture. We combine the
results of Fig. 1 (d) and Eqn. 4 to estimate the total energy
of a DNN layer when integrated with DG/DVAFS hardware
configuration as:
Elconfig = NA−kb ∗EA−kb +NC−kb ∗EC−kb ∗Econfigkb (5)
Econfigkb
is the energy per operation evaluated for a given
kb − bit precision and configuration as per Fig. 1 (d).
Besides energy, we also evaluate the overall memory com-
pression achieved with QUANOS. For a given layer convolu-
tional l, the total memory required is equivalent to the product
of total number of weights and the precision of the weights,
given by: Ml = I ×O × k2 × kb.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We test QUANOS on two prevailing image classification
benchmarks- CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. We use VGG-19 and
ResNet18 models to conduct all analysis on CIFAR10 and
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Fig. 2. Illustration of Quantization that is implemented with QUANOS on
(a) standard block comprising convolutional, batch-norm, relu operation, (b)
residual block with shortcut connection from layer l to l + 2.
CIFAR100, respectively. We imported github models and used
similar hyperparameters and training methodologies as [14] to
conduct our experiments in PyTorch. For fair energy compar-
ison, we use homogeneously quantized 8 − bit and 16 − bit
precision models trained from scratch as baselines. We find
that 8−bit and 16−bit models achieve iso-accuracy with that
of a 32−bit model. We compare the energy/memory efficiency,
adversarial accuracy (i.e. measure of robustness) and clean test
accuracy of the final network obtained with QUANOS to that
of the corresponding baselines. Note, as in most quantization
works, we quantize the model’s weights and activations to
optimal bit-widths during forward propagation. The gradient
calculation and update steps during backpropagation are done
using full 32 − bit precision. In QUANOS, as outlined in
Algorithm 1, we train a 16 − bit model initially for 30
epochs. Then, based on the ANS calculation, we quantize the
individual layers of the DNN. In our experiments, we calculate
the ANS metric based on adversarial inputs created using WB
FGSM attack with  = 0.05 for a random 1000-2000 sample
of training inputs.
Fig. 2 illustrates a quantized block of a DNN that is used
for forward propagation in VGG, ResNet-like models. While
quantization is pretty straightforward in VGG-like architec-
tures, the residual connection in a ResNet model needs to
be carefully quantized. Say, there is a shortcut connection
between layer l and layer l + 2. We quantize the shortcut
connection based on the ANS metric evaluated for layer l+ 2
i.e. the shortcut has the same precision as the layer into which
it feeds.
In our experiments, all layers of a DNN except the final
output layer are quantized. The final output layer for a
baseline/QUANOS model remains at 32 − bit precision. We
also train both baseline and QUANOS models for 210 epochs
where accuracy saturation occurs. For robustness, we measure
the adversarial accuracy of the models against WB FGSM
and PGD attacks. PGD is one of the strongest attacks known
in literature that casts adversaries over multiple steps [2]:
Xt+1adv = Π(X
t
adv+α(∇XL(θ,X, ytrue))). In our experiments,
we craft FGSM attacks for  range- {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25,
0.3}. For PGD, we craft attacks over t = 7 steps of size
α = 2/255 over  range-{8/255, 16/255, 32/255} as denoted
in many recent works [2], [4], [5].
A. CIFAR10
Table II illustrates the varying precision of different layers
for a CIFAR10 VGG-19 model obtained with QUANOS. The
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Fig. 3. (a) ANS values shown for QUANOS and 16-bit baseline VGG-19 model after training on CIFAR10 for certain number of epochs. Adversarial loss
shown across different VGG-19 models trained on CIFAR10 for different perturbation strengths () against (b) FGSM attack, (c) PGD attack.
TABLE II
RESULT SUMMARY OF CIFAR10 VGG-19 MODEL.THE BIT-PRECISION OF EACH CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER (C1...C17) IS SHOWN.
Model Layers Accuracy Memory
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 Compression
Baseline-1 ————-16-bit————- 91.6 0.32G (1×)
Baseline-2 ————-8-bit————- 91.4 0.16G (0.5×)
Baseline-3 ————-5-bit————- 90.5 0.1G (0.31×)
QUANOS 9-b 4-b 5-b 3-b 3-b 3-b 4-b 2-b 4-b 6-b 9-b 8-b 9-b 7-b 3-b 2-b 2-b 90.7 0.09G (0.27×)
TABLE III
ENERGY RESULTS ON CIFAR10 VGG-19 MODELS OF TABLE II FOR
DIFFERENT HARDWARE CONFIGURATIONS.
Model Energy (in mJ)
Standard DG DVAFS
Baseline-1 1.47 (1×) 1.47 (1×) 1.47 (1×)
Baseline-2 0.75 (0.51×) 0.62 (0.42×) 0.47 (0.32×)
Baseline-3 0.49 (0.33×) 0.36 (0.24×) 0.29 (0.2×)
QUANOS 0.39 (0.26×) 0.29 (0.2×) 0.25 (0.17×)
TABLE IV
COMPARISON WITH ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ON CIFAR10 VGG-19
MODEL OF TABLE II. ADVERSARIAL LOSS SHOWN FOR  = {2, 8, 16}/255
FOR FGSM, PGD ATTACKS.
Scenario Model FGSM PGD
AdvTrain+FGSM 16-bit 10.6, 39.6, 54 7.6, 49, 81QUANOS 9, 31, 43 7, 44, 72
AdvTrain+PGD 16-bit 12.6, 41, 56 11, 43, 67QUANOS 8.5, 34.5, 52 6.5, 37.5, 65.5
average bit precision of the QUANOS model evaluated across
all layers is 4.95 bits. For fair comparison of energy and adver-
sarial accuracy at iso-compression, we trained a homogenously
quantized 5-bit precision model for 210 epochs. The test accu-
racy of the baseline (Baseline−1, Baseline−2, Baseline−3
corresponding to 16-bit, 8-bit and 5-bit respectively) and the
QUANOS model on clean inputs are comparable. We plot the
ANS values of the 16-bit baseline model (after 30 epochs of
training as well as full training cycle of 210 epochs) and
the model obtained with QUANOS (after full 210 epochs
of training) in Fig. 3 (a). Note, the higher ANS layers are
quantized to lower precisions. ANS quantifies the net adver-
sarial perturbation contribution of different layers of a network.
Interestingly, the overall ANS value for the QUANOS model
is lower than that of the partially and fully trained baseline
which implies that quantization curtails adversarial sensitivity.
Fig. 3 (b), (c) compare the adversarial robustness of the
QUANOS model with that of 16-bit Baseline − 1 and 5-
bit Baseline − 3 against FGSM, PGD attacks. The plots in
Fig. 3 (b), (v) show the overall Adversarial loss measured as
Clean Test Accuracy - Adversarial Accuracy. Thus, lower loss
implies higher robustness. We find that QUANOS consistently
yields lower loss than the baseline models across varying . We
observe ∼ 10% (∼ 15%) higher robustness in FGSM (PGD)
attacks with QUANOS than a similar sized 5-bit baseline.
The net energy calculated using Eqn. 4, 5 for different
configurations are also shown in Table III. Standard corre-
sponds to the accelerator configuration without any hardware
scalability features. The MAC hardware architecture is de-
signed for a 16-bit baseline. Hence, integrating DG, DVAFS
does not change the overall energy consumption of the 16-
bit precision model. We start observing savings by lowering
the bit-precision of the model (Table III). QUANOS yields
∼ 3.8 × −5.9× energy reduction over the 16-bit baseline
and ∼ 1.8 × −2× lower energy than 8-bit baseline at iso-
accuracy. Table II also shows the memory compression results.
QUANOS yields ∼ 3.7× (1.2×) higher compression than 8-
bit (5-bit) baseline, respectively. The advantage of memory
compression with QUANOS is that the training cost incurred
in the hybrid model will also be ∼ 3.7× lower than the 8-bit
model baseline at iso-epochs.
In Fig. 3 (b), (c), we see that adversarial attacks cause
sharp increase in adversarial loss. While QUANOS provides
an inherent resilience, strong attacks with high perturbation
strengths () have devastating effects. To mitigate the ad-
versarial effects, we can integrate our model with defense
mechanisms. Adversarial training [2] is currently the strongest
method for defense. By augmenting the training set with adver-
sarial samples, the network learns to classify adversarial sam-
ples correctly. Augmenting the dataset with adversaries created
using WB FGSM attacks is referred to as AdvTrain+FGSM.
Similarly, augmenting dataset with WB PGD adversaries is
referred as AdvTrain+PGD. It is evident AdvTrain+PGD will
provide a stronger defense than AdvTrain+FGSM since we
train the network with stronger adversaries for the former.
6TABLE V
RESULT SUMMARY OF CIFAR100 RESNET-18 MODEL.THE BIT-PRECISION OF EACH CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER (C1...C17) IS SHOWN.
Model Layers Accuracy Memory
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 Compression
Baseline-1 ————-16-bit————- 76.7 0.18G (1×)
Baseline-2 ————-8-bit————- 74 0.09G (0.5×)
Baseline-3 ————-4-bit————- 72.1 0.05G (0.25×)
QUANOS 9-b 8-b 7-b 4-b 5-b 3-b 4-b 2-b 3-b 2-b 3-b 2-b 2-b 2-b 2-b 2-b 2-b 72.8 0.024G (0.14×)
TABLE VI
ENERGY RESULTS ON CIFAR100 RESNET18 MODELS OF TABLE V FOR
DIFFERENT HARDWARE CONFIGURATIONS.
Model Energy (in mJ)
Standard DG DVAFS
Baseline-1 1.44 (1×) 1.44 (1×) 1.44 (1×)
Baseline-2 0.75 (0.52×) 0.45 (0.32×) 0.13 (0.09×)
Baseline-3 0.40 (0.28×) 0.165 (0.114×) 0.023 (0.02×)
QUANOS 0.32 (0.22×) 0.17 (0.118×) 0.095 (0.07×)
Table IV compares the adversarial loss of a 16-bit base-
line and QUANOS model (shown in Table II) trained with
adversarial data augmentation. In case of QUANOS, we per-
form adversarial training after conducting ANS analysis and
hybridizing the layers with varied precision. While adversarial
training substantially improves the robustness of both models,
QUANOS yields ∼ 1% − 10% and ∼ 4% lower adversarial
loss than the 16-bit baseline against FGSM and PGD attacks
across different , respectively. Thus, integrating QUANOS
with state-of-the-art defense techniques can amplify robustness
even outperforming the state-of-the-art methods.
B. CIFAR100
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Fig. 4. Adversarial loss shown across different ResNet18 models trained on
CIFAR100 for different  against (b) FGSM attack, (c) PGD attack.
Table V, VI show the accuracy, memory compression and
overall energy results for CIFAR100 ResNet18 models across
different bit-precision scenarios: Baseline-1 (16-bit), Baseline-
2 (8-bit), Baseline-3 (4-bit) and QUANOS (Hybrid). The bit-
precision of the different layers of the QUANOS model aver-
ages to ∼ 3.65. Thus, we perform iso-compression comparison
between QUANOS and Baseline-3. Overall, QUANOS yields
higher energy efficiency and memory compression benefits
at near iso-accuracy than all baseline models in most cases
(3.6× memory compression, 1.4 × −2.4× energy efficiency
than 8-bit Baseline-2). We find that for DG, DVAFS hardware
configuration, QUANOS yields slightly higher energy than
Baseline-3 (Table VI). The higher energy in QUANOS is a
consequence of its high precision (> 4 − bit) initial layers
C1−C5 (Table V). Note, as explained in Fig. 2, the residual
TABLE VII
COMPARISON WITH ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ON CIFAR100 RESNET18
MODEL FROM TABLE V. ADVERSARIAL LOSS SHOWN FOR
 = {2, 8, 16}/255 FOR FGSM, PGD ATTACKS.
Scenario Model FGSM PGD
AdvTrain+FGSM 4-bit 12.6, 43.6, 58.6 9.6, 66, 90QUANOS 8.6, 37.6, 56.6 5.6, 19, 34
AdvTrain+PGD 4-bit 13, 21.3, 25.8 15.6, 26.6, 30.3QUANOS 11.2, 16.3, 20 9, 10.4, 14.9
connections in QUANOS are scaled to the same bit-precison
as the layer it feeds into. That is, according to Table V, a
shortcut connection between C2 (8-bit) and C4 (4-bit) will be
quantized to 4-bit.
Fig. 4 (a), (b) show the adversarial loss of the models across
FGSM, PGD attacks. QUANOS yields 4% − 7% lower loss
than 8-bit baseline. QUANOS and 4-bit model exhibit similar
robustness to FGSM attacks, while, QUANOS is more resilient
against PGD attacks. Table VII shows how QUANOS models
trained with adversarial training perform with respect to a
adversarially trained 4-bit model (Baseline-3) against strong
PGD attacks. QUANOS has significantly (> 10% adversarial
loss difference for large  PGD attacks) higher adversarial
robustness than 4-bit Baseline-3.
V. CONCLUSION
We present QUANOS- a structured method for hybrid
quantization of different layers of a deep neural network
to produce energy-efficient, accurate and adversarially robust
models. We propose a novel metric, adversarial noise sensitiv-
ity (ANS), that evaluates the contribution of each layer towards
adversarial noise and then, determines the optimal bit-width
per layer. We perform energy evaluation of quantized models
on hardware architectures integrated with data gating (DG)
and dynamic voltage accuracy frequency scaling (DVAFS)
features. Our experiments on CIFAR10, CIFAR100 datasets
reveal QUANOS yields significant benefits than homoge-
neously quantized 8-bit and similar sized baseline models.
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